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Introduction 
 
Recent trends in governance include a diminishing role of the nation state and an 
expanding role of non-government actors in the management of resources and 
services. The nation state, some argue, is ceding way to a plethora of institutions 
including global, multinational, regional, and local-level players.  Within this multi-
level, multi-institutional governance system the role of both the private sector and 
civil society in governance and development is attracting much attention, particularly 
with respect to accountability issues. As a result, a ‘complex and dense set of 
obligations and responsibilities between different actors in the field of development’ 
are emerging,  ‘result[ing] both in new mechanisms ensuring accountable behaviour 
and [in] new “accountability gaps”’ (Bellour and Newell 2001.) 
 
Civil society (CS) is often seen as a ‘watchdog’ of government and private actors, 
participating in public forums, campaigning and advocating for greater accountability 
and respect for citizens’ rights. Out of these ‘civil regulation’ processes, however, civil 
society organisations and multinational corporations have sometimes emerged as 
‘unlikely bedfellows’ (ibid: 2). Global alliances are blurring national and institutional 
boundaries, establishing relationships and initiatives without clearly defined 
constituencies. The heterogeneous multi-level nature of CS, and the complex and 
dynamic context within which it operates, raise questions for research and debate 
around its own accountability. This is of particular relevance in terms of struggles for 
environmental rights, where property rights of ‘global’ environmental resources are 
hazily defined.   
 
This article examines a case that illustrates the challenges associated with civil 
society accountability (CSA) in the context of a struggle for rights associated with 
biodiversity conservation and development.  It looks at civil society’s role in Mexico’s 
debate around  ‘the exploration, extraction and screening of biological diversity and 
indigenous knowledge for commercially valuable genetic and biochemical resources’ 
(Pimbert 1997: 422), or bioprospecting.  In so doing, it explores a number of 
questions that are raised regarding the way CS representation, responsibility, and 
voice are played out in a legislative vacuum where rights to access and benefits from 
biodiversity – be they cultural, economic, environmental or knowledge-based – 
remain ambiguous and contested.  How have CS actors presented indigenous 
people’s cultural, economic, environmental and knowledge rights in the 
bioprospecting debate?  How do these presentations vary? What do these contrasts 
and differences tell us about issues of representation and legitimacy in developing 
and maintaining civil society’s own accountability?  
 
With the aim of addressing these issues, this article is structured as follows.  Section 
1 presents the ambiguities found in the legislation that guides bioprospecting in 
Mexico. Its second part introduces the two bioprospecting initiatives around which 
Mexico’s bioprospecting debate is centred, and the way public claim processes 
carried out by CS actors make use of existing legislation and loop holes to articulate 
on behalf of local and indigenous peoples’ rights.  This sets the stage for an 
exploration of our main case study, that of the UZACHI-Sandoz bioprospecting 
project.  Section 2 describes this particular initiative, introducing its key actors and 
situating them historically in a broader regional struggle for natural resources in the 
area.  In section 3, problems and questions raised by these contradicting positions in 
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terms of civil society accountability and related issues of cultural, economic 
environmental and knowledge rights are explored more fully.     
 
Section 1:  Legislative mechanisms, gaps and debate in Mexico's 
bioprospecting arena 
 
Proponents of bioprospecting see it as a means through which biologically diverse 
countries and localities can profit from their natural endowment(s).  Critics of 
bioprospecting make two broad arguments. Radical critics consider the 
commodification and privatisation of biological resources, and the knowledge base 
that underpins their utility, as a threat to both biological and cultural diversity.  Their 
argument is that in practice bioprospecting does not value biodiversity until it is 
absorbed into international commodity circuits (McAfee 1999: 138-139), and that 
through shifting common resources into areas of capital concentration, they are 
alienating them from their original custodians (Shiva 1997: 72).  This is seen to have 
negative repercussions for biodiversity’s traditional users as it devalues local 
knowledge systems, displaces local rights, and creates a monopoly of rights to 
diversity (1997: 68).   
 
Other more reformist critics see no problem inherent to bioprospecting, and are more 
concerned with the ambiguous legislation and policies that govern it in practice.  Both 
levels of criticism are played out in Mexico’s debate around bioprospecting. 
 
The 1992 multilateral Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) has attempted to 
reconcile the conservation of biodiversity with its development, making specific 
reference to ‘the sustainable use of [biodiversity’s] components and the fair and 
equitable benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources…’ (Article 1).  
However, the ambiguity surrounding biodiversity-related property rights leads to 
contradictions in the document.   
 
On the one hand, the CBD’s Article 15 confirms the sovereign rights of states  over 
their biological resources, demanding that access to these resources occur under the 
prior informed consent of, and on ‘mutually agreed terms’ with source-country 
governments.  On the other, its Article 8(j) commits nation-states to ‘respect, 
preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local 
communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity…and [to] encourage the equitable sharing of 
the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices’.  
Differing interpretations of these Articles and their respective prevalence can lead to 
further complications and challenges associated with operationalising the 
Convention.  This is particularly true for developing countries blessed with biologically 
diverse areas but also characterised by a history of unequal and detrimental relations 
between indigenous/ local communities inhabiting such areas, and state 
governments.  
 
In Mexico the political void resulting from the absence of a clear legislative framework 
specifically regulating bioprospecting access and benefit sharing (ABS) 
arrangements adds to the obvious problems born of differentiated power relations 
between project stakeholders. Mexico ratified the CBD in 1993, and although 1996 
revisions to Mexico’s Law of Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection 
(LGEEPA) do not outline precise guidelines regulating bioprospecting, its Articles 87 
and 87Bis. do address the collection of wild flora and fauna for “biotechnological” 
use.  Reiterating the CBD’s Article 8(j), this law ‘mandat[es] that such collections 
proceed only with the permission of the legitimate landowners, and that benefits from 
the elaboration of these resources accrue to those landowners’ (Hayden 2000: 121).  
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Further marking a political shift towards shared governance in this arena is another 
1996 revision, LGEEPA’s Article 189.  The LGEEPA denuncia, or public claims 
mechanism, stipulates that ‘all persons, social groups, non-governmental 
organisations, associations and companies (sociedades) can present public claims 
regarding any event, act or neglect that produces or might produce ecological 
disequilibrium or environmental damage’.  It is within this legislative framework that 
CS actors publicly denounced two on-going bioprospecting projects, instigating a 
heated public debate.  
 
In February 2000, with the support of various other CS actors, the Organización de 
Médicos Indígenas del Estado de Chiapas, (Chiapas’ Organisation of Indigenous 
Healers), or OMIECh, used this denuncia mechanism to legally challenge a 
bioprospecting initiative funded by the US government’s International Cooperative 
Biodiversity Groups (ICBG).  In its public claim, OMIECh contested that their demand 
for the legal protection of their knowledge and natural resources – a prerequisite to 
their participation in the project – was not fulfilled.  They also expressed concern over 
the privatisation of collected materials – something they felt contradicted indigenous 
culture in the area.  One month later, a coalition of CS organisations similarly 
denounced a bioprospecting agreement established between the Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) and the US-based company, Diversa. 
Through this agreement, the latter was given access to all micro-organisms collected 
in Mexico by the University’s Biotechnology Institute.  Among other things, the public 
claim asserted that the UNAM is not a government body nor the legitimate landholder 
in collection areas, and therefore not the legitimate owner of the micro-organic 
samples it had negotiated to exchange with Diversa.  Both contracts were thus 
considered to undermine the CBD’s Article 8(j) and LGEEPA's Article 87 and 87Bis., 
violating local communities material and knowledge rights.   
 
National government response to these denuncias seems to have sided with civil 
society.  In October 2000, after unsuccessful efforts to mediate the conflict, 
government denied a collection permit for the ICBG project, and in November 2001 
the US government confirmed the project officially terminated.  In the case of UNAM-
Diversa, the federal attorney recommended that the project be annulled until actors 
party to the contract respect existing legislation.  Furthermore, it suggested that a 
broad-based public consultation be carried out in the design of regulatory norms and 
policies governing future bioprospecting access and benefit sharing arrangements.   
 
Thus CS efforts appear to have been relatively successful in expressing public 
concerns around bioprospecting and in pressurising for more accountable legislative 
norms.   Furthermore, the debate emanating from the CS actions effectively raised 
awareness with respect to legislative ambiguities around the issue of biological 
resource property rights, pointing out potential conflicts in terms of nationally- and 
locally- articulated environmental rights.  In this way Mexico’s debate around 
bioprospecting reflects discussions that are taking place in broader academic arenas, 
and the challenges that such initiatives have in practice.  
 
Although the debate centred around the condemnation of these two projects, as it 
progressed another bioprospecting initiative negotiated between a community-based 
CS actor and a multinational pharmaceutical company was drawn into the debate.  
As will be seen, this example raises a number of questions related to how civil 
society at various levels interprets indigenous rights and the way in which 
bioprospecting inherently violates them. It is to this unique case that we now turn to. 
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Section 2: Bioprospecting in Oaxaca's Sierra Juárez 
 
In the early 1990s, in the state of Oaxaca, an organisation made up of four 
indigenous communities in the Sierra Juárez, the Unión de Comunidades 
Productoras Forestales Zapoteca-Chinantecas, or the UZACHI, negotiated a 
bioprospecting contract with the multinational pharmaceutical company, Sandoz (now 
Novartis).  Most simply described, the contract involved the provision of microbiotic 
mushroom samples, collected from the UZACHI’s forests, to Sandoz, in exchange for 
training and a fully-equipped laboratory for the collection and characterisation of the 
samples by the local communities.  In addition to these infrastructure and capacity 
building components, the company agreed to pay monetary compensation for the 
samples themselves, as well as an agreed lump sum payment in the event that any 
commercial product derived from the samples proves profitable.  
 
The local CS actors directly involved in negotiating and carrying out the project 
consider their bioprospecting experience a positive one that could contribute 
significantly to the communities’ longer term sustainable development process.  In 
contrast, neighbouring community representatives and CS organisations, as well as 
NGOs of national and international scope, condemn the initiative, and consider it 
similar to the two other projects described above.   
 
Little attention was paid to the CS voice supporting the UZACHI-Sandoz project in 
the bioprospecting debate.  In order to understand more fully the “local” perspective, 
it must be situated historically within a broader regional struggle for natural resources 
in the area. During the 1950s, Mexican forestry policy endorsed a system of forest 
concessions.  The system was considered to be both environmentally detrimental 
and in violation of community-based land rights outlined in Mexico’s Constitution.  
Coinciding with the 1970s rise in social movements in Mexico, community ejidos in 
the Sierra Juárez began to mobilise and articulate demands for control of their land's 
forests.  In 1983, after much struggle and protest, the government chose not to 
renew the concession to the private sector and authorised communities to 
independently manage their forests. 
 
In addition to the movement's success decentralising natural resource management 
and thus reinstating the rights of local citizens to manage and directly profit from their 
forests, a number of civil society institutions and relationships emerged from this 
struggle.  Between 1985 and 1990 collaborative community efforts worked to centre 
technical forestry services around community objectives, while also building local 
capacity in the area of forestry management (SEMARNAP, Del. Oaxaca – 
PROCYMAP 2000).  It is out of one such initiative that the UZACHI was born.  
 
The UZACHI acquired its legal status in 1989.  It is an organisation with a 
membership made up of approximately 950 comuneros, representing four indigenous 
communities located in the Sierra Norte, in Oaxaca’s Sierra Juárez. Comuneros, men 
whose livelihoods are dependent on natural resources (and thus benefit from 
participating in the communal decision-making process provided by the UZACHI), 
differ from other community members in that they are registered with the legal entity 
responsible for managing shared natural resources. 
 
The UZACHI communities have a total land holding of 26,000 hectares, of which 88 
per cent is forest cover (Ramírez Domínguez 1999). UZACHI communities have in 
common the objective of developing self-reliant natural resource management 
practices.  Thus, primary among UZACHI’s institutional strategy is capacity building 
among technicians and comuneros in the field of sustainable forest resource 
management.  The UZACHI deals with forest or natural resource management 
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issues, serving as a mechanism through which decisions in this area are made.  It is 
also responsible for the development of project proposals.  Proposals must be 
passed through the Delegate Assembly – a body made up of delegates nominated by 
comuneros participating in Community Assemblies, or asambleas. 
 
The Oaxaca city-based NGO Estudios Rurales Ambientales, or ERA, has served as 
advisor to the UZACHI.  Their relationship was born out of the period of struggle for 
community resource control in the Sierra, and even before ERA acquired legal status 
in 1984, it was involved in both natural resource management and capacity-building 
activities with communities that today constitute the UZACHI.  According to both 
these organisations, it is ERA's respect for indigenous decision-making mechanisms, 
and a shared history of working together which has led to a strong and on-going 
partnership between ERA and the UZACHI. Most recently this has manifested itself 
in the area of bioprospecting.  
 
A bioprospecting affair:  the collaboration of unlikely bedfellows 
 
The UZACHI became interested in bioprospecting when they discovered uninvited 
researchers collecting biological materials from their lands.  With the raised 
awareness that their lands held something valuable, and an interest in benefiting 
from this apparent natural wealth, the UZACHI approached ERA for assistance.  
They felt that working in a collaborative arrangement with an actor knowledgeable in 
bioprospecting would "cut the chains of biopiracy" and allow the UZACHI to benefit 
directly from their land’s biological wealth.  It was through such an initiative that the 
UZACHI hoped to identify areas of highest potential for pharmaceutical production in 
their forests, and to create mechanisms to generate access to genetic resources to 
further their own bioprospecting capabilities. Between 1992 and 1995 ERA facilitated 
negotiations between the UZACHI and Sandoz, and after the community-based 
organisation terms and conditions were met, a bioprospecting contract was 
established between them.  The project was initiated in 1995 and ended in 1998.   
 
That this project was drawn into the debate and condemned alongside the ICBG-
Maya and UNAM-Diversa projects put under questions its claims to contribute 
towards positive community development.  Interviews with UZACHI and ERA 
representatives, and CS actors critical of the initiative conveyed very differing 
interpretations of the issue.   
 
The UZACHI perspective concurs with the CBD's understanding that bioprospecting 
is a means through which biologically diverse countries and localities can profit from 
their natural endowment(s).   Bioprospecting is considered and treated as an 
opportunity for the UZACHI (and other small farmer and indigenous organisations) to 
exploit an emerging niche market of biological diversity.  The wealth of biological 
diversity on their lands places them at an advantage.  However, as the nature of the 
negotiations and the project suggest, technical capacity in terms of collecting, 
analysing and developing biological samples is necessary if such groups are to move 
beyond being raw materials providers.   
 
Indeed, the nature of the contract reflects UZACHI's protectionist approach to their 
land and knowledge rights, and an active ownership of the project.  For instance, the 
contract stipulated no-outsider access;  Sandoz was not to access the site and it was 
the UZACHI (and ERA) who was to be responsible for selecting the collection sites, 
collecting the mushrooms, and categorising the samples.  Access to indigenous 
knowledge was explicitly excluded from the contract.  Effectively, in inviting the 
foreign company in and demanding accountability from them, the UZACHI filled an 
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"accountability gap", creating a bilateral agreement between a community based 
organisation and a multinational corporate actor.   
 
The UZACHI ownership of the project has had further effects.  First, the negotiation 
process was seen as one that generated a lot of confidence among the UZACHI in 
terms of increased awareness and capacity to negotiate.  Their decision to opt for a 
fixed-sum payment in the case that a compound of value be discovered, versus a 
percentage of royalties, demonstrates an appreciation that the company may not be 
honest in disclosing the total profit acquired from such a compound.  They were also 
conscious of the time such developments often take.  UZACHI's Ramírez Domínguez 
describes the “fixed-sum option” as a lottery ticket which may or may not have the 
winning number.  It is not a gamble the UZACHI seem to be banking on. 
 
Second, the direct involvement of the comuneros ensures sustainable use of 
resources, reinforcing the principle of "global subsidiarity":  a presumption favouring 
local decision-making on the basis that it is more likely to respond to local needs and 
livelihood realities (Bellour and Newell 2001: 2).  The CBO's holistic perception of the 
forest as a resource base and its understanding of the project as one element among 
others in a longer on-going process are confirmed by post-project initiatives that are 
making use of the technical and human infrastructure developed through the project.  
For instance, local biologists trained for the project are now employing advanced 
DNA analysis to research potential methods of increasing wild mushroom 
populations in their forests.  If successful, the UZACHI plan to designate forest areas 
exclusively for the cultivation and sale of mushrooms, catering to an emerging niche 
market in this area.  On-going research is also using advanced techniques to 
cultivate ornamental plants whose sale is meant to finance future maintenance of 
wilderness areas.  Both research projects fall into the UZACHI's non-extractive forest 
development strategy.   
 
In other words, bioprospecting in this case is treated as a means through which local 
community can exercise their rights to access and benefit from their environmental 
rights.  The nature of the contract helps to ensure that knowledge and biodiversity 
access rights will be protected.  Moreover, its negotiation generated a strong sense 
of local awareness, as well as of ‘foreign’ knowledge and practices.  Furthermore, it 
created a strong sense of confidence among the UZACHI, both in its traditional 
decision-making mechanisms, and more generally, as an organisation.  It could be 
argued that such intangible benefits might move beyond basic economic 
development needs, fostering a sense of cultural integrity, and a capacity to claim 
other rights in the future.  
 
The ERA/UZACHI approach is not entirely in accordance with the CBD however.  As 
a bilateral agreement negotiated between a communities based organisation, and a 
global corporate partner, it seems to have effectively side-stepped the actor 
traditionally governing natural resources - the state.  This raises important questions 
about the project and its executors' accountability, particularly given the ambiguous 
nature of rights to access and benefit from biodiversity.  
 
Irrespective of the role of the local indigenous voice in supporting the project, and its 
apparent positive influence on the capacity of the communities to preserve 
biodiversity in the area in the future, the project is condemned by neighbouring 
community representatives and CS organisations, as well as NGOs of national and 
international scope. These actors argue that the project was negotiated and carried 
out secretively, that the exchange negotiated was unfair and exploitative for the 
communities directly involved in the contract, as well as for neighbouring 
communities sharing similar biodiversity but not invited to participate in (and therefore 
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benefit from) the exchange.  Rather than a protection of rights through negotiation, 
they see the case as a violation of the environment and knowledge rights of 
indigenous communities.  
 
Section 3: Diverse understandings of rights and accountabilities 
 
The case of the UZACHI-Sandoz project illustrates the multifaceted nature of 
accountability.  It also illustrates difficult challenges for how to build representative 
and responsible environmental governance in a contemporary multi-level, multi-
institutional system characterised by legislative ambiguities and contested 
interpretations of rights. 
 
The UZACHI-Sandoz bioprospecting project has attempted to “cut the chains of 
biopiracy”, and push for corporate accountability through a community-initiated 
bioprospecting endeavour.  This has resulted in an institutional arrangement between 
“unlikely bedfellows” – the local community organisation and a multinational 
pharmaceutical company.   That a number of combined elements made the deal 
possible cannot be emphasised enough.  These include the capacity of the CBO to 
negotiate effectively with the multinational and to take ownership of the project.  Also 
relevant is the ambiguous nature of regulatory frameworks in the field of 
bioprospecting and the contestation around property rights related to biodiversity.   
 
To claim their perceived rights, and to make their claims for accountability on the part 
of the corporation, the citizens used their own form of indigenous organisation, in this 
case a comunero-run forum representing four indigenous communities, with the 
assistance of an NGO. The shared historical struggle of these communities, and the 
related concern for sustainable use of forest resources, legitimated a need for 
community control of the project.  This, in conjunction with a pragmatic approach to 
conservation and development, led to the UZACHI’s effective exploitation of the 
space left by the voice in global and national legislation regulating bioprospecting.   
 
At the time of negotiation this combination of factors ensured a space for a bilateral 
agreement between the community-based organisation and the multinational 
corporation agreement, side-stepping the CBD’s Article 15, and asserting local 
control over biodiversity resources exercised by the group of indigenous peoples.  In 
this light the project supports the prevalence of Articles 8(j) and 87, 87Bis., in the 
CBD and Mexico’s LGEEPA, respectively.  And, in so doing, it appears to be a case 
from which other local and/ or indigenous groups also endowed with biological 
diversity could also learn.   
 
On the other hand, other voices claiming to represent civil society disagree.  For 
them the goods being negotiated are shared and non-commodifiable common goods;  
their privatisation threatens indigenous rights.  Furthermore, the fact that they cannot 
be isolated as a resource – like a tree or a mushroom can, for instance – challenges 
a fair and equitable distribution of the benefits that might accrue from effective 
access to and exploitation of these ‘biodiversity rights’.   
 
The case clearly raises thorny issues of representation, legitimacy and accountability 
within civil society. Is it fair that one community based organisation benefit 
economically, or in terms of technical and human capital, from exercising their rights 
to what is effectively a common good? Or in other words, in such a case to whom are 
UZACHI and ERA accountable?  As local civil society organisations, how 
accountable are they to their extra- and intra-community constituents or other project 
stakeholders? Indeed, who are those community members actively articulating their 
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rights as members of the UZACHI?  What are their interests?  And how broad a base 
do they represent? 
 
The case also challenges ‘homogeneous’ understandings of civil society and 
oversimplified perceptions of rights. It illustrates the differences within and amongst 
civil society actors, whose interests and perceptions of rights have themselves been 
shaped by differing social and historical circumstances, and may in fact be 
competing. In such cases, what are the potential conflicts that might emerge amongst 
civil society actors about whose rights are most legitimate?  How might such conflicts 
build or draw upon already existing historical animosities?  And, if this occurs, how 
might such conflicts be resolved? 
 
These are difficult questions which cannot be ignored in debates about how citizens 
participate in claiming their rights, and in holding corporate and state actors 
accountable.  Ultimately, those who promote the new role of civil society as actors in 
upholding rights, and as watchdogs in holding corporate and state actors 
accountable, must also examine and address issues of representation and diversity 
within civil society itself.  
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